Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoerner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Yale University; National University of Singapore; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA12182
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1795-1848
• 关键词: Folk theorem; IDENTIFIABILITY PROBLEM; INFORMATION; extraction; collusion; surplus

摘要

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated, and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except for the punishment level: if players withhold their information during punishment-like phases, a folk theorem obtains.