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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Yale University; National University of Singapore; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated, and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, ...
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作者：Levy, Yehuda John; McLennan, Andrew
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Queensland
摘要：Levy (2013) presented examples of discounted stochastic games that do not have stationary equilibria. The second named author has pointed out that one of these examples is incorrect. In addition to describing the details of this error, this note presents a new example by the first named author that succeeds in demonstrating that discounted stochastic games with absolutely continuous transitions can fail to have stationary equilibria.
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作者：Andrews, Donald W. K.; Ely, Jeffrey C.
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作者：Sadzik, Tomasz; Stacchetti, Ennio
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; New York University
摘要：The paper analyzes dynamic principal-agent models with short period lengths. The two main contributions are: (i) an analytic characterization of the values of optimal contracts in the limit as the period length goes to 0, and (ii) the construction of relatively simple (almost) optimal contracts for fixed period lengths. Our setting is flexible and includes the pure hidden action or pure hidden information models as special cases. We show how such details of the underlying information structure...
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作者：Gayle, George-Levi; Golan, Limor; Miller, Robert A.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard, and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm-size pay gap. We find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size, certainty-equivalent pay decreases with firm size. In larger firms, and for more highly ra...
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作者：Benhabib, Jess; Wang, Pengfei; Wen, Yi
作者单位：New York University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Tsinghua University
摘要：We formalize the Keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations. When production decisions must be made under imperfect information about demand, optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self-fulfilling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without persistent informational frictions, externalities, nonconvexities, or strategic complementarities in production. The models we consider ...
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作者：Myerson, Roger; Weibull, Jorgen
作者单位：University of Chicago; Stockholm School of Economics; Royal Institute of Technology
摘要：When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usually develop so that people tend to disregard alternatives outside the convention. For rational players to usually restrict attention to a block of conventional strategies, no player should prefer to deviate from the block when others are likely to act conventionally and rationally inside the block. We explore two set-valued concepts, coarsely and finely tenable blocks, that formalize this notion for finite normal-form games. We ...
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作者：Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv
作者单位：New York University; Brown University
摘要：Harsanyi (1974) criticized the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set for its presumption that coalitions are myopic about their prospects. He proposed a new dominance relation incorporating farsightedness, but retained another feature of the stable set: that a coalition S can impose any imputation as long as its restriction to S is feasible for it. This implicitly gives an objecting coalition complete power to arrange the payoffs of players elsewhere, which is clearly unsatisfactory. While ...
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作者：Elliott, Graham; Mueller, Ulrich K.; Watson, Mark W.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Princeton University
摘要：This paper considers nonstandard hypothesis testing problems that involve a nuisance parameter. We establish an upper bound on the weighted average power of all valid tests, and develop a numerical algorithm that determines a feasible test with power close to the bound. The approach is illustrated in six applications: inference about a linear regression coefficient when the sign of a control coefficient is known; small sample inference about the difference in means from two independent Gaussia...
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作者：Kneeland, Terri
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：Strategic choice data from a carefully chosen set of ring-network games are used to obtain individual-level estimates of higher-order rationality. The experimental design exploits a natural exclusion restriction that is considerably weaker than the assumptions underlying alternative designs in the literature. In our data set, 93 percent of subjects are rational, 71 percent are rational and believe others are rational, 44 percent are rational and hold second-order beliefs that others are ration...
