KNIGHTIAN ANALYSIS OF THE VICKREY MECHANISM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chiesa, Alessandro; Micali, Silvio; Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA12131
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1727-1754
• 关键词: expected utility; incentive compatibility; completeness axiom; Bounded mechanisms; implementation; preferences; REPRESENTATION; uncertainty; DESIGN

摘要

We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and we prove that all dominant-strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal.