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作者：Arellano, Manuel; Blundell, Richard; Bonhomme, Stephane
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Chicago
摘要：We develop a new quantile-based panel data framework to study the nature of income persistence and the transmission of income shocks to consumption. Log-earnings are the sum of a general Markovian persistent component and a transitory innovation. The persistence of past shocks to earnings is allowed to vary according to the size and sign of the current shock. Consumption is modeled as an age-dependent nonlinear function of assets, unobservable tastes, and the two earnings components. We establ...
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作者：Anderson, Axel; Smith, Lones; Park, Andreas
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga
摘要：We develop a continuum player timing game that subsumes standard wars of attrition and pre-emption games, and introduces a new rushes phenomenon. Payoffs are continuous and single-peaked functions of the stopping time and stopping quantile. We show that if payoffs are hump-shaped in the quantile, then a sudden rush of players stops in any Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium.Fear relaxes the first mover advantage in pre-emption games, asking that the least quantile beat the average; greed relax...
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作者：Canay, Ivan A.; Romano, Joseph P.; Shaikh, Azeem M.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Stanford University; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper develops a theory of randomization tests under an approximate symmetry assumption. Randomization tests provide a general means of constructing tests that control size in finite samples whenever the distribution of the observed data exhibits symmetry under the null hypothesis. Here, by exhibits symmetry we mean that the distribution remains invariant under a group of transformations. In this paper, we provide conditions under which the same construction can be used to construct tests...
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作者：Diermeier, Daniel; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Northwestern University; University of Chicago; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：It is often argued that additional constraints on redistribution such as granting veto power to more players in society better protects property from expropriation. We use a model of multilateral bargaining to demonstrate that this intuition may be flawed. Increasing the number of veto players or raising the supermajority requirement for redistribution may reduce protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property protection. One is formal con...
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作者：Kadan, Ohad; Reny, Philip J.; Swinkels, Jeroen M.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Chicago; Northwestern University
摘要：We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection. We allow multidimensional types, actions, and signals, as well as both financial and non-financial rewards. Our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism, and allow the principal to have decisions in additio...
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作者：Chesher, Andrew; Rosen, Adam M.
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Duke University
摘要：This paper develops characterizations of identified sets of structures and structural features for complete and incomplete models involving continuous or discrete variables. Multiple values of unobserved variables can be associated with particular combinations of observed variables. This can arise when there are multiple sources of heterogeneity, censored or discrete endogenous variables, or inequality restrictions on functions of observed and unobserved variables. The models generalize the cl...
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作者：Calford, Evan; Oprea, Ryan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：The theory of continuous time games (Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), Bergin and MacLeod (1993)) shows that continuous time interactions can generate very different equilibrium behavior than conventional discrete time interactions. We introduce new laboratory methods that allow us to eliminate natural inertia in subjects' decisions in continuous time experiments, thereby satisfying critical premises of the theory and enabling a first-time direct test. Applying these new methods to a simple timing...
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作者：Basu, Susanto; Bundick, Brent
作者单位：Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City
摘要：Can increased uncertainty about the future cause a contraction in output and its components? An identified uncertainty shock in the data causes significant declines in output, consumption, investment, and hours worked. Standard general-equilibrium models with flexible prices cannot reproduce this comovement. However, uncertainty shocks can easily generate comovement with countercyclical markups through sticky prices. Monetary policy plays a key role in offsetting the negative impact of uncerta...
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作者：Judd, Kenneth L.; Maliar, Lilia; Maliar, Serguei
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Universitat d'Alacant; Santa Clara University
摘要：We propose a novel methodology for evaluating the accuracy of numerical solutions to dynamic economic models. It consists in constructing a lower bound on the size of approximation errors. A small lower bound on errors is a necessary condition for accuracy: If a lower error bound is unacceptably large, then the actual approximation errors are even larger, and hence, the approximation is inaccurate. Our lower-bound error analysis is complementary to the conventional upper-error (worst-case) bou...
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作者：Daskalakis, Constantinos; Deckelbaum, Alan; Tzamos, Christos
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. This measure expresses the marginal change in the seller's revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types. As a corollary, we characterize the optimality of grand-bundling mechanisms, strengthening severa...
