Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kadan, Ohad; Reny, Philip J.; Swinkels, Jeroen M.
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); University of Chicago; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA12340
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 769-823
• 关键词: 1st-order approach; moral hazard; INFORMATION; CONTRACTS; randomization; incentives; games

摘要

We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection. We allow multidimensional types, actions, and signals, as well as both financial and non-financial rewards. Our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism, and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent's contract. Beyond measurability, we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms. It is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it (should be and) is permitted. Randomization also plays an essential role in our proof. We also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary.