Political Economy of Redistribution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Diermeier, Daniel; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Northwestern University; University of Chicago; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA12132
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 851-870
• 关键词: dynamic theory; POLICY-MAKING; constitutions; MODEL

摘要

It is often argued that additional constraints on redistribution such as granting veto power to more players in society better protects property from expropriation. We use a model of multilateral bargaining to demonstrate that this intuition may be flawed. Increasing the number of veto players or raising the supermajority requirement for redistribution may reduce protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property protection. One is formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution that is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where players without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal veto power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their influence to prevent redistributions. In a stable allocation, the society exhibits a class structure with class members having equal wealth and strategically protecting each other from redistribution.