Optimal Monitoring Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Georgiadis, George; Szentes, Balazs
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16475
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2075-2107
• 关键词: optimal-contracts; moral hazard; risk-taking; incentives; provision; policies

摘要

This paper considers a Principal-Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information-acquisition strategy is a two-threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for the frequently observedsingle-bonus wage contracts.