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作者：Adusumilli, Karun
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We provide a decision-theoretic analysis of bandit experiments under local asymptotics. Working within the framework of diffusion processes, we define suitable notions of asymptotic Bayes and minimax risk for these experiments. For normally distributed rewards, the minimal Bayes risk can be characterized as the solution to a second-order partial differential equation (PDE). Using a limit of experiments approach, we show that this PDE characterization also holds asymptotically under both parame...
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作者：Butters, R. Andrew; Dorsey, Jackson; Gowrisankaran, Gautam
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Renewable energy and battery storage are seen as complementary technologies that can together facilitate reductions in carbon emissions. We develop and estimate a framework to calculate the equilibrium effects of large-scale battery storage. Using data from California, we find that the first storage unit breaks even by 2024 without subsidies when the renewable energy share reaches 50%. Equilibrium effects are important: the first 5000 MWh of storage capacity would reduce wholesale electricity ...
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作者：Almagro, Milena; Dominguez-Iino, Tomas
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper shows the endogeneity of amenities plays a crucial role in determining the welfare distribution of a city's residents. We quantify this mechanism by building a dynamic model of residential choice with heterogeneous households, where consumption amenities are the equilibrium outcome of a market for non-tradables. We estimate our model using Dutch microdata and leveraging variation in Amsterdam's spatial distribution of tourists as a demand shifter, finding significant heterogeneity i...
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作者：Buchholz, Nicholas; Doval, Laura; Kastl, Jakub; Matejka, Filip; Salz, Tobias
作者单位：Princeton University; Columbia University; University of Cambridge; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We recover valuations of time using detailed data from a large ride-hail platform, where drivers bid on trips and consumers choose between a set of rides with different prices and wait times. Leveraging a consumer panel, we estimate demand as a function of both prices and wait times and use the resulting estimates to recover heterogeneity in the value of time across consumers. We study the welfare implications of personalized pricing and its effect on the platform, drivers, and consumers. Taki...
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作者：Cesa-Bianchi, Nicolo; Colomboni, Roberto; Kasy, Maximilian
作者单位：University of Milan; Polytechnic University of Milan; University of Oxford
摘要：We consider the problem of repeatedly choosing policies to maximize social welfare. Welfare is a weighted sum of private utility and public revenue. Earlier outcomes inform later policies. Utility is not observed, but indirectly inferred. Response functions are learned through experimentation.We derive a lower bound on regret, and a matching adversarial upper bound for a variant of the Exp3 algorithm. Cumulative regret grows at a rate of T2/3. This implies that (i) welfare maximization is hard...
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作者：Collier, Benjamin L.; Ellis, Cameron M.; Keys, Benjamin J.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; University of Iowa; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：How do collateral requirements impact consumer borrowing behavior? Using administrative loan application and performance data from the U.S. Federal Disaster Loan Program, we exploit a loan amount threshold above which households must post their residence as collateral. Our bunching estimates suggest that the median borrower is willing to give up 40% of their loan amount to avoid posting collateral. Exploiting time variation in the threshold, we estimate collateral causally reduces default rate...
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作者：Vatter, Benjamin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Policymakers and market intermediaries often use quality scores to alleviate asymmetric information about product quality. Scores affect the demand for quality and, in equilibrium, its supply. Equilibrium effects break the rule whereby more information is always better, and the optimal design of scores must account for them. In the context of Medicare Advantage, I find that consumers' information is limited, and quality is inefficiently low. A simple design alleviates these issues and increase...
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作者：Liu, Tingjun; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick
摘要：We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash-flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second-highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's informa...
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作者：Bloedel, Alexander W.; Krishna, R. Vijay; Leukhina, Oksana
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：We study the implications of optimal insurance provision for long-run welfare and inequality in economies with persistent private information. A principal insures an agent whose private type follows an ergodic, finite-state Markov chain. The optimal contract always induces immiseration: the agent's consumption and utility decrease without bound. Under positive serial correlation, it also backloads high-powered incentives: the sensitivity of the agent's utility with respect to his reports incre...
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作者：Cingano, Federico; Palomba, Filippo; Pinotti, Paolo; Rettore, Enrico
作者单位：European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; Princeton University; Bocconi University; University of Padua; Fondazione Bruno Kessler; FBK-IRVAPP - Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies
摘要：We estimate the employment effects of a large program of public investment subsidies to private firms that ranked applicants on a score reflecting both objective rules and local politicians' discretion. Leveraging the rationing of funds as an ideal Regression Discontinuity Design, we characterize the heterogeneity of treatment effects and cost-per-new-job across inframarginal firms and estimate the cost-effectiveness of subsidies under factual and counterfactual allocations. Firms ranking high...
