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作者：Garin, Andrew; Koustas, Dmitri; Mcpherson, Carl; Norris, Samuel; Pecenco, Matthew; Rose, Evan K.; Shem-Tov, Yotam; Weaver, Jeffrey
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of British Columbia; Brown University; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the effect of incarceration on wages, self-employment, and taxes and transfers in North Carolina and Ohio using two quasi-experimental research designs: discontinuities in sentencing guidelines and random assignment to judges. Across both states, incarceration generates short-term drops in economic activity while individuals remain in prison. As a result, a year-long sentence decreases cumulative earnings over five years by 13%. Beyond five years, however, there is no evidence of lowe...
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作者：Carnehl, Christoph; Schneider, Johannes
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Is more novel research always desirable? We develop a model in which knowledge shapes society's policies and guides the search for discoveries. Researchers select a question and how intensely to study it. The novelty of a question determines both the value and difficulty of discovering its answer. We show that the benefits of discoveries are nonmonotone in novelty. Knowledge expands endogenously step-by-step over time. Through a dynamic externality, moonshots-research on questions more novel t...
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作者：Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents, when each agent is to receive one object and has strict preferences over the objects. Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Answering a longstanding open question, we show that RSD is not characterized by those properties-there are other mechanisms satisfying equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategy-proofness which are not welfa...
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作者：Breunig, Christoph; Liu, Ruixuan; Yu, Zhengfei
作者单位：University of Bonn; Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of Tsukuba
摘要：We propose a double robust Bayesian inference procedure on the average treatment effect (ATE) under unconfoundedness. For our new Bayesian approach, we first adjust the prior distributions of the conditional mean functions, and then correct the posterior distribution of the resulting ATE. Both adjustments make use of pilot estimators motivated by the semiparametric influence function for ATE estimation. We prove asymptotic equivalence of our Bayesian procedure and efficient frequentist ATE est...
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作者：Kawai, Kei; Sunada, Takeaki
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo; University of Rochester
摘要：We estimate valence measures of candidates running in U.S. House elections from data on vote shares. Our identification and estimation strategy builds on ideas developed for estimating production functions, allowing us to control for possible endogeneity of campaign spending and sample selection of candidates due to endogenous entry. We find that incumbents have substantially higher valence measures than challengers running against them, resulting in about 3.5 percentage-point differences in t...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.; Georgiadis, George; Rayo, Luis
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the joint design of dynamic incentives and performance feedback for an environment with a coarse (all-or-nothing) measure of performance, and show that hiding information from the agent can be an optimal way to motivate effort. Using a novel approach to incentive compatibility, we derive a two-phase solution that begins with a silent phase where the agent is given no feedback and is asked to work non-stop, and ends with a full-transparency phase where the agent stops working as soon a...
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作者：Cavaliere, Giuseppe; Mikosch, Thomas; Rahbek, Anders; Vilandt, Frederik
作者单位：University of Bologna; University of Exeter; University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen
摘要：Based on the GARCH literature, Engle and Russell (1998) established consistency and asymptotic normality of the QMLE for the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model, assuming strict stationarity and ergodicity of the durations. Using novel arguments based on renewal process theory, we show that their results hold under the stronger requirement that durations have finite expectation. However, we demonstrate that this is not always the case under the assumption of stationary and ergodic ...
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作者：Dekel, Eddie; Quah, John K. -H.; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; National University of Singapore; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative-statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very little about costs: only a mild monotonicity condition is required. We use this insight to prove a general Le Chatelier principle: under the ordinal complementarity assumptions, if short-run adjustment is subject to a monotone cost, then the long-run response t...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Duanmu, Haosui
作者单位：Harbin Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We propose two general equilibrium models, quota equilibrium, and emission tax equilibrium. Government specifies quotas or taxes on emissions, and then refrains from further action. All results remain valid regardless of how government chooses its emissions target. Quota equilibrium exists; the allocation of emission property rights impacts the distribution of welfare. If the only externality arises from total net emissions, quota equilibrium is Pareto optimal among all feasible outcomes with ...
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作者：Agarwal, Nikhil; Hodgson, Charles; Somaini, Paulo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice-based mechanisms perform well when assessed based on these outcomes. This paper evaluates the assignment mechanism for allocating deceased donor kidneys on the basis of patient life-years from transplantation ...
