Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ely, Jeffrey C.; Georgiadis, George; Rayo, Luis
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21871
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 597-621
• 关键词: Contracts

摘要

We study the joint design of dynamic incentives and performance feedback for an environment with a coarse (all-or-nothing) measure of performance, and show that hiding information from the agent can be an optimal way to motivate effort. Using a novel approach to incentive compatibility, we derive a two-phase solution that begins with a silent phase where the agent is given no feedback and is asked to work non-stop, and ends with a full-transparency phase where the agent stops working as soon as a performance threshold is met. Hiding information leads to greater effort, but an ignorant agent is also more expensive to motivate. The two-phase solution-where the agent's ignorance is fully frontloaded-stems from a backward compounding effect that raises the cost of hiding information as time passes.