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作者：Ball, Laurence; Mankiw, N. Gregory
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Harvard University
摘要：This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent- claims markets. The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system. One conclusion is that the syst...
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作者：Bayer, Patrick; Ferreira, Fernando; McMillan, Robert
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper develops a framework for estimating household preferences for school and neighborhood attributes in the presence of sorting. It embeds a boundary discontinuity design in a heterogeneous residential choice model, addressing the endogeneity of school and neighborhood characteristics. The model is estimated using restricted-access Census data from a large metropolitan area, yielding a number of new results. First, households are willing to pay less than 1 percent more in house prices -...
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作者：Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier; Rey, Helene
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University
摘要：We explore the implications of a country's external constraint for the dynamics of net foreign assets, returns, and exchange rates. Deteriorations in external accounts imply future trade surpluses (trade channel) or excess returns on the net foreign portfolio (valuation channel). Using a new data set on U. S. gross external positions, we find that stabilizing valuation effects contribute 27 percent of the cyclical external adjustment. Our approach has asset- pricing implications: external imba...
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作者：Jacquet, Nicolas L.; Tan, Serene
作者单位：Singapore Management University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matc...
