On the segmentation of markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jacquet, Nicolas L.; Tan, Serene
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/521967
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 639-664
• 关键词: 2-sided search; unemployment

摘要

This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.