Intergenerational risk sharing in the spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with applications to social security design
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ball, Laurence; Mankiw, N. Gregory
署名单位：
Johns Hopkins University; Harvard University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-3808
DOI：
10.1086/520646
发表日期：
2007
页码：
523-547
关键词：
摘要：
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent- claims markets. The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system. One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns.
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