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作者:Natenzon, Paulo
作者单位:Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要:Context-dependent individual choice challenges the principle of utility maximization. I explain context dependence as the optimal response of an imperfectly informed agent to the ease of comparison of the options. I introduce a discrete choice model, the Bayesian probit, which allows the analyst to identify stable preferences from context-dependent choice data. My model accommodates observed behavioral phenomena-including the attraction and compromise effects-that lie beyond the scope of any r...
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作者:Morten, Melanie
作者单位:Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:When people can self-insure via migration, they may have less need for informal risk sharing. At the same time, informal insurance may reduce the need to migrate. To understand the joint determination of migration and risk sharing, I study a dynamic model of risk sharing with limited commitment frictions and endogenous temporary migration. First, I characterize the model. Second, I structurally estimate the model using the new ICRISAT panel from rural India. Third, I introduce a rural employme...
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作者:Morelli, Massimo; Negri, Margherita
作者单位:Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of St Andrews
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作者:Banerjee, Abhijit; Hanna, Rema; Kyle, Jordan; Olken, Benjamin A.; Sumarto, Sudarno
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
摘要:We explore the impact of allowing for outsourcing service delivery to the private sector within Indonesia's largest targeted transfer program. In a field experiment across 572 municipalities, we find that allowing for outsourcing the last mile of food delivery reduced operating costs without sacrificing quality. However, the prices citizens paid were lower only where we modified the bidding rules to encourage more bidders. Higher rents are associated with greater entry despite elites' efforts ...
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作者:Collard-Wexler, Allan; Gowrisankaran, Gautam; Lee, Robin S.
作者单位:Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Arizona; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Harvard University
摘要:A Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for Nash-in-Nash bargaining that extends Rubinstein's alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to Nash-i...
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作者:Lester, Benjamin; Shourideh, Ali; Venkateswaran, Venky; Zetlin-Jones, Ariel
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Carnegie Mellon University; New York University
摘要:We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into a standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We characterize the unique equilibrium and use our characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. We show that the relationship between an agent's type, the quantity he trades, and the price he pays is jointly determined by the severity of adverse selection and the concentration of market powe...
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作者:Acemoglu, Daron; Naidu, Suresh; Restrepo, Pascual; Robinson, James A.
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University; Boston University; University of Cambridge
摘要:We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new indicator of democracy that consolidates previous measures. Our baseline results show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run. We find similar effects using a propensity score reweighting st...
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作者:Dhingra, Swati; Morrow, John
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; Birkbeck University London
摘要:Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of productivity differences within industries and their role in resource allocation. This paper examines the allocational efficiency of such markets. Productivity differences introduce two new margins of potential inefficiency: selection of the right distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities across firms. We show that these considerations affect welfare and policy analysis, and market power across firms leads to distortio...
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作者:Eugster, Beatrix; Parchet, Raphael
作者单位:University of St Gallen; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universita della Svizzera Italiana
摘要:We propose a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the existence of interjurisdictional tax competition. Our strategy rests on differences between desired tax levels determined by culture-specific preferences and equilibrium tax levels determined by fiscal externalities and by preferences. While preferences differ systematically between French-speaking and German-speaking Swiss municipalities, local income tax burdens exhibit smooth spatial gradients. To qualify the empirical evidence...
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作者:Coles, Melvyn G.; Francesconi, Marco
作者单位:University of Essex
摘要:This paper considers equilibrium two-sided search with ex ante heterogeneous agents, vectors of attributes, and idiosyncratic match draws. The analysis applies to a large class of models, from the nontransferable utility case to the collective household model with bargaining, for which transferable utility is a special case. The approach is powerful for it identifies a simple algorithm that, in our numerical application, is found to rapidly converge to equilibrium. Our application explores the...