Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Collard-Wexler, Allan; Gowrisankaran, Gautam; Lee, Robin S.
• 署名单位: Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Arizona; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/700729
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 163-195
• 关键词: Vertical Integration; price-discrimination; COMPETITION; exclusivity; networks; MARKETS; mergers; buyers; POWER

摘要

A Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for Nash-in-Nash bargaining that extends Rubinstein's alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices, that is, each pair's Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.