Private Outsourcing and Competition: Subsidized Food Distribution in Indonesia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banerjee, Abhijit; Hanna, Rema; Kyle, Jordan; Olken, Benjamin A.; Sumarto, Sudarno
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/700734
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 101-137
• 关键词: EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; field experiment; auctions; procurement; entry; COSTS

摘要

We explore the impact of allowing for outsourcing service delivery to the private sector within Indonesia's largest targeted transfer program. In a field experiment across 572 municipalities, we find that allowing for outsourcing the last mile of food delivery reduced operating costs without sacrificing quality. However, the prices citizens paid were lower only where we modified the bidding rules to encourage more bidders. Higher rents are associated with greater entry despite elites' efforts to block reform. In this context, the option to outsource and sufficient competition generated significant benefits relative to public distribution.