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作者：Andries, Marianne; Haddad, Valentin
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Information aversion-a preference-based fear of news flows-has rich implications for decisions involving information and risk-taking. It can explain key empirical patterns on how households pay attention to savings, namely, that investors observe their portfolios infrequently, particularly when stock prices are low or volatile. Receiving state-dependent alerts following sharp market downturns, such as during the financial crisis of 2008, improves welfare. Information-averse investors display a...
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作者：Bagues, Manuel; Campa, Pamela
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) study how gender quotas in candidate lists affect voting behavior using evidence from the introduction of quotas in the 2007 Spanish local elections in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, they show that parties that listed fewer female candidates in the previous election obtained more votes in the subsequent election in larger municipalities, a pattern that they attribute to the quota. We show robustness and pl...
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作者：Deb, Joyee
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：I consider markets in which participants have very little information: for instance, agents are anonymous, cannot verify each other's identities, or have little information about each other's past transactions. I ask whether it is possible to prevent opportunistic behavior in such settings in the absence of contractual enforcement. I model such markets as repeated anonymous-random-matching games and show that cooperation is sustainable if players are sufficiently patient and can announce their...
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作者：Ito, Koichiro; Zhang, Shuang
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We develop a framework to estimate willingness to pay for clean air from defensive investments on differentiated products. Applying this framework to scanner data on air purifier sales in China, we find that a household is willing to pay $1.34 annually to remove 1 mu g/m(3) of air pollution (PM10) and $32.7 annually to eliminate the pollution induced by the Huai River heating policy. Substantial heterogeneity is explained by income and exposure to information on air pollution. Using these esti...
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作者：Almas, Ingvild; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Tungodden, Bertil
作者单位：Stockholm University; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：There are striking differences in inequality and redistribution between the United States and Scandinavia. To study whether there are corresponding differences in social preferences, we conducted a large-scale international social preference experiment where Americans and Norwegians make distributive choices in identical environments. Combining the infrastructure of an international online labor market and that of a leading international data collection agency, we show that Americans and Norwe...
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作者：Fang, Dawei; Noe, Thomas; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：University of Gothenburg; University of Oxford; Yale University
摘要：We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both reduce inequality and increase output. Holding promo...
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作者：Jacobsen, Mark R.; Knittel, Christopher R.; Sallee, James M.; van Benthem, Arthur A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Corrective taxes can solve many market failures, but actual policies frequently deviate from the theoretical ideal because of administrative or political constraints. We present a method to quantify the efficiency costs of constraints on externality-correcting policies or, more generally, the costs of imperfect pricing, using simple regression statistics. Under certain conditions, the R-2 and the sum of squared residuals from a regression of true externalities on policy variables measure relat...
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作者：Pomatto, Luciano; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Yale University
摘要：Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. We extend our res...
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作者：Andreoni, James; Aydin, Deniz; Barton, Blake; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Naecker, Jeffrey
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Washington University (WUSTL); Stanford University; Wesleyan University
摘要：In settings with uncertainty, tension exists between ex ante and ex post notions of fairness. Subjects in an experiment most commonly select the ex ante fair alternative ex ante and switch to the ex post fair alternative ex post. One potential explanation embraces consequentialism and construes reversals as time inconsistent. Another abandons consequentialism in favor of deontological (rule-based) ethics and thereby avoids the implication that revisions imply inconsistency. We test these expla...
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作者：Decarolis, Francesco; Polyakova, Maria; Ryan, Stephen P.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Stanford University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; National Bureau of Economic Research; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：The efficiency of publicly subsidized, privately provisioned social insurance programs depends on the interaction between strategic insurers and the subsidy mechanism. We study this interaction in the context of Medicare's prescription drug coverage program. We find that the observed mechanism is successful in keeping raise-the-subsidy incentives relatively low, acts much like a flat voucher, and obtains a level of welfare close to that for the optimal voucher. Across a range of counterfactual...
