Information Aversion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andries, Marianne; Haddad, Valentin
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1901-1939
• 关键词: myopic loss aversion; GENERALIZED DISAPPOINTMENT AVERSION; risk-aversion; optimal inattention; prospect-theory; utility-theory; stock-market; long-run; asset; consumption

摘要

Information aversion-a preference-based fear of news flows-has rich implications for decisions involving information and risk-taking. It can explain key empirical patterns on how households pay attention to savings, namely, that investors observe their portfolios infrequently, particularly when stock prices are low or volatile. Receiving state-dependent alerts following sharp market downturns, such as during the financial crisis of 2008, improves welfare. Information-averse investors display an ostrich behavior: overhearing negative news prompts more inattention. Their fear of frequent news encourages them to hold undiversified portfolios.