When Fair Isn't Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals Involving Social Preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andreoni, James; Aydin, Deniz; Barton, Blake; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Naecker, Jeffrey
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Washington University (WUSTL); Stanford University; Wesleyan University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1673-1711
• 关键词: behavior; Consistency; models; equity; games

摘要

In settings with uncertainty, tension exists between ex ante and ex post notions of fairness. Subjects in an experiment most commonly select the ex ante fair alternative ex ante and switch to the ex post fair alternative ex post. One potential explanation embraces consequentialism and construes reversals as time inconsistent. Another abandons consequentialism in favor of deontological (rule-based) ethics and thereby avoids the implication that revisions imply inconsistency. We test these explanations by examining contingent planning and the demand for commitment. Our findings suggest that the most common attitude toward fairness involves a time-consistent preference for applying a naive deontological heuristic.