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作者：Weyl, E. Glen; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：University of Chicago; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：What is the best way to reward innovation? While prizes avoid deadweight loss, intellectual property (IP) selects high social surplus projects. Optimal innovation policy thus trades off the ex ante screening benefit and the ex post distortion. It solves a multidimensional screening problem in the private information held by the innovator: research cost, quality, and market size of the innovation. The appropriate degree of market power is never full monopoly pricing and is determined by measura...
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作者：Burgess, Robin; Hansen, Matthew; Olken, Benjamin A.; Potapov, Peter; Sieber, Stefanie
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); The World Bank
摘要：Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions and threatens the world's most diverse ecosystems. Much of this deforestation is driven by illegal logging. We use novel satellite data that tracks annual deforestation across eight years of Indonesian institutional change to examine how local officials' incentives affect deforestation. Increases in the number of political jurisdictions lead to increased deforestation and lower timber prices, consistent with Courn...
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作者：Fryer, Roland G., Jr.; Levitt, Steven D.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：In this article, we analyze the 1920s Ku Klux Klan, those who joined it, and its social and political impact by combining a wide range of archival data sources with data from the 1920 and 1930 U.S censuses. We find that individuals who joined the Klan in some cities were more educated and more likely to hold professional jobs than the typical American. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that the Klan had an effect on black or foreign-born residential mobility or vote totals. Rather than a t...
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作者：Casey, Katherine; Glennerster, Rachel; Miguel, Edward
作者单位：Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Despite their importance, there is limited evidence on how institutions can be strengthened. Evaluating the effects of specific reforms is complicated by the lack of exogenous variation in institutions, the difficulty of measuring institutional performance, and the temptation to cherry pick estimates from among the large number of indicators required to capture this multifaceted subject. We evaluate one attempt to make local institutions more democratic and egalitarian by imposing participatio...
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作者：Gibbons, Robert; Holden, Richard; Powell, Michael
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of New South Wales Sydney; Northwestern University
摘要：We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of firms, each consisting of a party who can reduce production cost and a party who can discover information about demand. Both parties can make specific investments at private cost, and there is a machine that either party can control. As in incomplete-contracting models, different governance structures (i.e., different allocations of control of the machine) creat...
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作者：Bloom, Nicholas; Sadun, Raffaella; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We argue that social capital as proxied by trust increases aggregate productivity by affecting the organization of firms. To do this we collect new data on the decentralization of investment, hiring, production, and sales decisions from corporate headquarters to local plant managers in almost 4,000 firms in the United States, Europe, and Asia. We find that firms headquartered in high-trust regions are significantly more likely to decentralize. To help identify causal effects, we look within mu...
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Fudenberg, Drew; Holden, Richard; Kunimoto, Takashi; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Harvard University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Hitotsubashi University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations. First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense t...
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作者：Philippon, Thomas; Reshef, Ariell
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Virginia
摘要：We study the allocation and compensation of human capital in the U.S. finance industry over the past century. Across time, space, and subsectors, we find that financial deregulation is associated with skill intensity, job complexity, and high wages for finance employees. All three measures are high before 1940 and after 1985, but not in the interim period. Workers in finance earn the same education-adjusted wages as other workers until 1990, but by 2006 the premium is 50% on average. Top execu...
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作者：Fershtman, Chaim; Pakes, Ariel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a framework for the analysis of dynamic oligopolies with persistant sources of asymmetric information that enables applied analysis of situations of empirical importance that have been difficult to deal with. The framework generates policies that are relatively easy for agents to use while still being optimal in a meaningful sense, and is amenable to empirical research in that its equilibrium conditions can be tested and equilibrium policies are relatively easy to compute. We conclu...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Samuelson, Larry
摘要：We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that the short-run players make inferences by analogical reasoning, meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long-run player, but do not recognize how this play varies across h...
