Reputation with Analogical Reasoning
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Jehiel, Philippe; Samuelson, Larry
刊物名称：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0033-5533
DOI：
10.1093/qje/qjs031
发表日期：
2012
页码：
1927-1969
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that the short-run players make inferences by analogical reasoning, meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long-run player, but do not recognize how this play varies across histories. Concentrating on 2 x 2 games, we provide a characterization of equilibrium payoffs, establishing a payoff bound for the rational long-run player that can be strictly larger than the familiar Stackelberg bound. We also provide a characterization of equilibrium behavior, showing that play begins with either a reputation-building or a reputation-spending stage (depending on parameters), followed by a reputation-manipulation stage.