Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Empirical Work

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fershtman, Chaim; Pakes, Ariel
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjs025
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1611-1661
• 关键词: Markov perfect equilibrium

摘要

We develop a framework for the analysis of dynamic oligopolies with persistant sources of asymmetric information that enables applied analysis of situations of empirical importance that have been difficult to deal with. The framework generates policies that are relatively easy for agents to use while still being optimal in a meaningful sense, and is amenable to empirical research in that its equilibrium conditions can be tested and equilibrium policies are relatively easy to compute. We conclude with an example that endogenizes the maintenance decisions of electricity generators when the costs states of the generators are private information.