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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a bad type who never cooperates, (2) players observe and remember their partners' identities, and (3) each player interacts with others frequently but meets any particular partner infrequently. We show that these assumptions preclude cooperation in the absence of explicit communication but that introd...
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作者：Golosov, Mikhail; Iovino, Luigi
作者单位：University of Chicago; Bocconi University
摘要：We study optimal provision of unemployment insurance in a model where agents privately observe arrival of job opportunities and government's ability to commit is imperfect. Imperfect commitment implies that full information revelation is generally suboptimal. Social welfare is convex in the probability with which agents reveal their private information. In the optimum, each agent is provided with incentives to either fully reveal his private information or not reveal it at all. The optimal con...
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作者：Falk, Armin; Kosse, Fabian; Pinger, Pia; Schildberg-Horisch, Hannah; Deckers, Thomas
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Bonn; University of Munich; University of Cologne; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
摘要：This paper explores inequalities in IQ and economic preferences between children from families of high and low socioeconomic status (SES). We document that children from high-SES families are more intelligent, patient, and altruistic as well as less risk seeking. To understand the underlying mechanisms, we propose a framework of how SES, parental investments, as well as maternal IQ and preferences influence a child's IQ and preferences. Our results indicate that disparities in the level of par...
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作者：Huber, Kilian; Lindenthal, Volker; Waldinger, Fabian
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Munich
摘要：Large-scale increases in discrimination can lead to dismissals of highly qualified managers. We investigate how expulsions of senior Jewish managers, due to rising discrimination in Nazi Germany, affected large corporations. Firms that lost Jewish managers experienced persistent reductions in stock prices, dividends, and returns on assets. Aggregate market value fell by roughly 1.8% of German GNP because of the expulsions. Managers who served as key connectors to other firms and managers who w...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Sandomirskiy, Fedor; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. For two agents, we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann's agreement theorem and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions from a 1995 work by Dawid and colleagues. For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a no-trade condition. We use these ch...
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作者：Rubin, Amir; Rubin, Eran
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Reichman University; California State University System; California State University Fresno
摘要：We analyze the extent to which citing practices may be driven by strategic considerations. The discontinuation of the Journal of Business (JB) in 2006 for extraneous reasons serves as an exogenous shock for analyzing strategic citing behavior. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that articles published in JB before 2006 experienced a relative reduction in citations of approximately 20% after 2006. Since the discontinuation of JB is unrelated to the scientific contributions of i...
