Communication and Community Enforcement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/715023
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2595-2628
• 关键词: Repeated games; social norms; folk theorem; COOPERATION; gossip; reputation; players; TRADE

摘要

We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a bad type who never cooperates, (2) players observe and remember their partners' identities, and (3) each player interacts with others frequently but meets any particular partner infrequently. We show that these assumptions preclude cooperation in the absence of explicit communication but that introducing within-match cheap talk communication restores cooperation. Thus, communication is essential for community enforcement.