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作者：Demarzo, Peter; He, Zhiguo; Tourre, Fabrice
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We study an impatient, risk-neutral government that cannot commit to a particular debt path, financed by competitive lenders. In equilibrium, debt adjusts slowly toward a debt-to-income target, exacerbating booms and busts. Strikingly, gains from trade dissipate when trading is continuous, leaving the government no better off than in financial autarky, owing to a sovereign debt ratchet effect. Moreover, citizens who are more patient than their government are strictly harmed. We characterize eq...
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作者：Rustichini, Aldo; Iacono, William G.; Lee, James J.; Mcgue, Matt
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We extend a standard model of parental investment and intergenerational mobility to include a fully specified genetic analysis of skill transmission. The model's predictions differ substantially from the standard model's. The coefficient of intergenerational income elasticity (IGE) may be larger than that in the standard model and depends on the distribution of the genotype. The distribution of genetic endowments may be stratified according to income. The model is tested on data, including gen...
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作者：Diamond, Douglas W.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者：Hebert, Benjamin; La'O, Jennifer
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：We analyze efficiency and nonfundamental volatility in a class of generalized beauty-contest economies with endogenous information. As in models of rational-expectations equilibria, agents learn about exogenous states and endogenous aggregate actions. As in models of rational inattention, agents choose their information structures subject to a cost. We identify conditions on information costs that guarantee the existence of efficient or inefficient equilibria; we further identify conditions th...
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作者：Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Oxford
摘要：Edgeworth's paradox of taxation occurs when an increase in the unit cost of a product causes a multiproduct monopolist to reduce prices. We give simple illustrations of the paradox and a general analysis of the case of linear marginal cost and demand conditions, and we characterize which matrices of cost pass-through terms are consistent with profit maximization. When the firm supplies at least one pair of substitute products, we show how Edgeworth's paradox always occurs with a suitable choic...
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作者：Dybvig, Philip H.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
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作者：Bhaskar, V.; Li, Wenchao; Yi, Junjian
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Tongji University; Peking University
摘要：We analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. Investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. Distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in China) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g., men in China), since parents of boys will incr...
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作者：Alder, Simeon D.; Lagakos, David; Ohanian, Lee
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：No region of the United States fared worse over the postwar period than the Rust Belt. This paper analyzes how much of its decline can be accounted for by the persistent labor market conflict that characterized Rust Belt union-management relations. We develop a multisector, multiregion, dynamic general equilibrium model in which labor market conflict leads to strikes, wage premia, lower investment, and lower productivity growth. These lead to shrinking Rust Belt industries and to workers movin...
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作者：Pegoraro, Stefano
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：I characterize the dynamics of incentives in an optimal contract with investment delegation, moral hazard, and uncertainty about the agent's productivity. The principal increases the agent's incentives after good performance in order to delegate more capital to an agent with higher perceived productivity, thus implementing a convex pay-for-performance scheme. Moreover, the principal commits to reduce the agent's future incentives in order to mitigate ex ante investment distortions. Methodologi...
