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作者：Mulligan, Casey B.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Opioid mortality increases have been linked to both lax and restrictive opioid prescription regulations. Modeling choice between prescription and illicitly manufactured opioid sources helps reconcile the apparently contradictory empirical findings. It also identifies groups responding opposite of the average and applies previous studies to new supply conditions. Organized around the two supply channels, a policy database is assembled that reveals distinct pricing phases during 1999-2021. Consi...
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作者：Afrouzi, Hassan
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper studies how competition affects firms' expectations in a new dynamic general equilibrium model with rational inattention and oligopolistic competition where firms acquire information about their competitors' beliefs. In the model, firms with fewer competitors are less attentive to aggregate variables-a novel prediction supported by survey evidence. A calibrated version of the model matches the relationship between firms' numbers of competitors and their uncertainty about aggregate i...
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作者：Juhasz, Reka; Squicciarini, Mara P.; Voigtlander, Nico
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：New technologies tend to be adopted slowly and-even after being adopted-take time to be reflected in higher aggregate productivity. One prominent explanation is that major technological breakthroughs create the need to reorganize production. We study a unique setting that allows us to examine this mechanism: the adoption of mechanized cotton spinning during the first Industrial Revolution in France. Using a novel hand-collected, plant-level dataset from French archival sources, we show that a ...
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作者：Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I analyze a reputation game between a patient player and a sequence of short-run players. Each short-run player observes the number of times that the patient player took each of his actions in the past K periods. When players have monotone supermodular payoffs, the patient player can approximately secure his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of K. I also show that the short-run players can approximately attain their highest feasible payoff in all equilibria if and only if K is low...
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作者：Cox, Lydia; Mueller, Gernot J.; Pasten, Ernesto; Schoenle, Raphael; Weber, Michael
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Central Bank of Chile; Brandeis University; University of Chicago
摘要：Big G typically refers to aggregate government spending on a homogeneous good. We confront this notion with five facts for the universe of federal purchases. First, they are volatile and account for the largest part of the short-run variation in total spending. Second, the origin of their variation is granular. Third, purchases are subject to procurement and bidding. Fourth, they are concentrated in long-term contracts. Fifth, their composition is biased toward sectors in which private sector ...
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作者：Lancia, Francesco; Russo, Alessia; Worrall, Tim
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Padua; University of Edinburgh
摘要：How should successive generations insure each other when the young can default on previously promised transfers to the old? This paper studies intergenerational insurance that maximizes the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to participation constraints for each generation. If complete insurance is unattainable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from a generational shock is spread into the future w...
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作者：Farmer, Leland E.; Nakamura, Emi; Steinsson, Jon
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Forecasts of professional forecasters are anomalous: they are biased, and forecast errors are autocorrelated and predictable by forecast revisions. We propose that these anomalies arise because professional forecasters do not know the model that generates the data. We show that Bayesian agents learning about hard-to-learn features of the world can generate all the prominent aggregate anomalies emphasized in the literature. We show this for professional forecasts of nominal interest rates and C...
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作者：Oostrom, Tamar
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper estimates the effect of financial sponsorship of clinical trials on reported drug efficacy, leveraging the insight that the exact same pairs of drugs are often compared in different trials conducted by parties with different financial interests. I assemble new psychiatric trial data to estimate that a drug appears substantially more effective when the trial is sponsored by that drug's manufacturer, compared with the same drug tested against the same combination of drugs but without ...
