Intergenerational Insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lancia, Francesco; Russo, Alessia; Worrall, Tim
• 署名单位: Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Padua; University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/730206
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3500-3544
• 关键词: Overlapping generations; social-security; Debt sustainability; moral hazard; RISK; institutions; Solvency; models; MARKET; US

摘要

How should successive generations insure each other when the young can default on previously promised transfers to the old? This paper studies intergenerational insurance that maximizes the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to participation constraints for each generation. If complete insurance is unattainable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from a generational shock is spread into the future with periodic resetting. If we interpret intergenerational insurance in terms of debt, the fiscal reaction function is nonlinear and the risk premium on debt is lower than the risk premium with complete insurance.