Reputation Effects under Short Memories

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pei, Harry
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/730203
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3421-3460
• 关键词: Repeated games; COOPERATION; selection

摘要

I analyze a reputation game between a patient player and a sequence of short-run players. Each short-run player observes the number of times that the patient player took each of his actions in the past K periods. When players have monotone supermodular payoffs, the patient player can approximately secure his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of K. I also show that the short-run players can approximately attain their highest feasible payoff in all equilibria if and only if K is lower than some cutoff. This is because a larger K weakens the short-run players' incentives to punish the patient player.