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作者：Ghosh, Arkadev
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper implements a field experiment in India to study whether the effects of religious diversity on productivity and attitudes depend on a firm's production technology. I randomly assigned Hindu and Muslim workers at a manufacturing plant in West Bengal to mixed or homogeneous teams. Production tasks are categorized as high or low dependency based on the degree of continuous coordination required. Mixed teams are less productive than homogeneous teams in high-dependency tasks, but this ef...
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作者：Guo, Rufei; Yi, Junjian; Zhang, Junsen; Zhang, Ning
作者单位：Wuhan University; Peking University; Zhejiang University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We develop a generalized theory of rationed fertility to analyze treatment effect heterogeneity in the child quantity-quality trade-off. An exogenous increase in fertility can be either desired or undesired. We derive a positive rationing income effect on child quality for desired fertility increases but a negative rationing income effect for undesired fertility increases. We propose an econometric framework to identify treatment effects of desired and undesired fertility increases and estimat...
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作者：Bernini, Andrea; Facchini, Giovanni; Tabellini, Marco; Testa, Cecilia
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Nottingham; Harvard University
摘要：How did Southern whites respond to the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA)? Leveraging newly digitized data on county-level voter registration by race between 1956 and 1980 and exploiting predetermined variation in exposure to the federal intervention, we document that the VRA increases both Black and white political participation. Consistent with the VRA triggering white countermobilization, the surge in white registrations is concentrated in counties where African Americans represent a political th...
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作者：Mekonnen, Teddy; Murra-Anton, Zeky; Pakzad-Hurson, Bobak
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We consider sequential search by an agent who cannot observe the quality of goods but can acquire information from a profit-maximizing principal with limited commitment power. The principal can charge higher prices for more informative signals, but high future prices discourage continued search, thereby reducing the principal's profits. A unique stationary equilibrium outcome exists: the principal (i) sells the agent only partial information, (ii) induces the socially efficient stopping rule, ...
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作者：Chetverikov, Denis; Sorensen, Jesper Riis-Vestergaard
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Copenhagen
摘要：We develop a new method for selecting the penalty parameter for & ell;1-penalized M-estimators in high dimensions, which we refer to as bootstrapping after cross validation. We derive rates of convergence for the corresponding & ell;1-penalized M-estimator and also for the post-& ell;1-penalized M-estimator, which refits the nonzero entries of the former estimator without penalty in the criterion function. We demonstrate via simulations that our methods are not dominated by cross validation in...
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作者：Bakkensen, Laura; Phan, Toan; Wong, Tsz-Nga
作者单位：University of Oregon; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We develop a credit search model with maturity choice where agents disagree on when a long-run disaster will damage collateral assets. It predicts that disaster-pessimistic agents are more likely to leverage risky asset purchases and prefer debt contracts with longer maturities. Intuitively, pessimists value the default option of debt contracts as implicit disaster insurance, whose coverage increases with maturity implicitly and costs less to optimistic lenders. Using high-resolution sea level...
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Costa Dias, Monica; Meghir, Costas; Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Bristol; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Michigan State University
摘要：Positive assortative matching refers to the tendency of individuals with similar characteristics to form partnerships. Measuring the extent to which assortative matching differs between two economies is challenging when the marginal distributions of the sorting characteristic (e.g., education) change for either or both sexes. We show how the use of different measures can generate different conclusions. We provide an axiomatic characterization for the odds ratio, normalized trace, and likelihoo...
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作者：Heese, Carl; Lauermann, Stephan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Bonn; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous private preferences and exogenous private information about an unknown state of the world. We show that a Bayesian persuader can achieve any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the persuader's additional information, a version of the Condorcet jury theorem holds, in the sense that outcomes of large elections satisfy full-information equivalence....
