Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heese, Carl; Lauermann, Stephan
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong; University of Bonn; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/736767
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 3305-3348
• 关键词: SWING VOTERS CURSE; voting-behavior; THEOREM; rules; BIAS

摘要

This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous private preferences and exogenous private information about an unknown state of the world. We show that a Bayesian persuader can achieve any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the persuader's additional information, a version of the Condorcet jury theorem holds, in the sense that outcomes of large elections satisfy full-information equivalence. Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the voters' private information, preferences, or the voting rule. It also requires almost no commitment power on the part of the persuader.