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作者：Waldfogel, Joel
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：Women have traditionally participated in intellectual property creation at depressed rates relative to men. Book authorship is now an exception: women now publish more than half of new books. Adding new products can have significant welfare benefits, particularly when product quality is unpredictable. Growth in female-authored books has delivered substantial increases in the female-authored shares of consumption, book awards, and other measures of success, indicating that the additional female...
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作者：Le Grand, Francois; Ragot, Xavier
作者单位：Universite de Rennes; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We analyze optimal fiscal policy in a heterogeneous-agent model with capital accumulation and aggregate shocks, where the government uses public debt, a capital tax, and a progressive labor tax to finance public spending. We first study a tractable model and show that the steady-state optimal capital tax can be positive if credit constraints are occasionally binding. However, the existence of such an equilibrium depends on the shape of the utility function. We also characterize the optimal dyn...
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作者：Angeletos, George-Marios; Sastry, Karthik A.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Princeton University
摘要：We study the efficiency of inattentive but otherwise frictionless economies by augmenting the Arrow-Debreu framework with a flexible form of rational inattention. If attention costs satisfy an invariance condition embedded in Sims's mutual information specification, a version of the first welfare theorem holds no matter the degree of inattention. More generally, however, a cognitive externality may emerge, and welfare may be improved by regulating and simplifying markets. We discuss how these ...
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作者：Ash, Elliott; Morelli, Massimo; Vannoni, Matia
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University; University of London; King's College London
摘要：This paper analyzes the conditions under which more legislation contributes to economic growth. In the context of US states, we apply natural language processing tools to measure legislative flows for the years 1965-2012. We implement a novel shift-share design for text data, where the instrument for legislation is leave-one-out legal topic flows interacted with pretreatment legal topic shares. We find that at the margin, higher legislative output causes more economic growth. Consistent with m...
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作者：Wang, Shaoda; Yang, David Y.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
摘要：Governments use policy experiments to facilitate learning, but the nature and effects of these experiments remain unclear. We analyze China's policy experimentation since 1980-among the most systematic in history-and document three facts. First, most experiments exhibit positive sample selection. Second, local politicians exert excessive efforts during experiments that are not replicable during policies' national rollout. Third, the central government is not fully sophisticated when interpreti...
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作者：Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas; Lewis, Matthew S.; Marx, Leslie M.; Wu, Xiaosong
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Liverpool; Clemson University; Duke University
摘要：Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to asymmetric, with one firm losing access to high-frequency granular rival price data. We provide theory and empirics illustrating how strategic ignorance creates price commitment, leading to higher price-cost margins. Using a structural model, w...
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作者：Basak, Deepal; Zhou, Zhen
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Tsinghua University
摘要：We study optimal adversarial information design in a dynamic regime change game. Agents decide when to attack, if at all. We assume (1) delay incurs a continuous cost and (2) agents doubt the correctness of their actions. The game may end in a disaster due to weak fundamentals or panic-agents attacking despite sound fundamentals. We propose a timely disaster alert that promptly warns about impending disasters, making waiting for and following the alert the unique rationalizable strategy, there...
