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作者：Ghosh, Arkadev
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper implements a field experiment in India to study whether the effects of religious diversity on productivity and attitudes depend on a firm's production technology. I randomly assigned Hindu and Muslim workers at a manufacturing plant in West Bengal to mixed or homogeneous teams. Production tasks are categorized as high or low dependency based on the degree of continuous coordination required. Mixed teams are less productive than homogeneous teams in high-dependency tasks, but this ef...
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作者：Guo, Rufei; Yi, Junjian; Zhang, Junsen; Zhang, Ning
作者单位：Wuhan University; Peking University; Zhejiang University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We develop a generalized theory of rationed fertility to analyze treatment effect heterogeneity in the child quantity-quality trade-off. An exogenous increase in fertility can be either desired or undesired. We derive a positive rationing income effect on child quality for desired fertility increases but a negative rationing income effect for undesired fertility increases. We propose an econometric framework to identify treatment effects of desired and undesired fertility increases and estimat...
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作者：Gagnon, Nickolas; Bosmans, Kristof; Riedl, Arno
作者单位：Aarhus University; Maastricht University
摘要：We conduct experiments on an online platform to investigate the causal effect of gender discrimination on labor supply decisions. Controlling for the piece-rate wage, we find that workers who face explicit negative gender-discriminatory wage inequality supply substantially less labor compared with workers who face gender-neutral wage inequality. We also examine the effect of positive discrimination, differences between men and women, and the impact of implicit rather than explicit discriminati...
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作者：Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas; Lewis, Matthew S.; Marx, Leslie M.; Wu, Xiaosong
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Liverpool; Clemson University; Duke University
摘要：Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to asymmetric, with one firm losing access to high-frequency granular rival price data. We provide theory and empirics illustrating how strategic ignorance creates price commitment, leading to higher price-cost margins. Using a structural model, w...
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作者：Elliott, Jonathan T.; Houngbonon, Georges V.; Ivaldi, Marc; Scott, Paul T.
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; New York University
摘要：We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructure among mobile network operators. Although consolidation increases market power, it can lead to more efficient data transmission due to economies of scale, which we derive from physical principles. After estimating our model with French consumer and infrastructure data, equilibrium simulations reveal that while prices decrease with the number of firms, so do download speeds. Our framework also allows us to quantify the impact of spec...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando
作者单位：University of Chicago
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作者：Kong, Yunmi; Silveira, Bernardo S.; Tang, Xun
作者单位：Rice University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We develop and estimate a structural model of arbitration, accounting for asymmetric risk attitudes and learning. Using data on public sector wage disputes in New Jersey, we compare the efficiency of two popular arbitration formats: final offer and conventional. We find that although conventional arbitration hinders the transmission of case-relevant information from the disputants to the arbitrator, this format outperforms final offer arbitration by affording discretion to select awards. We al...
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作者：Slattery, Cailin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：State and local governments in the United States compete to attract firms by offering discretionary subsidies. I use a private value English auction to model the subsidy bidding process and quantify the welfare effects of competition. The allocation of rents between states and firms depends on the heterogeneity in states' valuations for firms and the substitutability of locations. I find that competition increases welfare by less than 5% over a subsidy ban, and states compete away the surplus,...
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作者：Mak, Eric; Siow, Aloysius
作者单位：University of Jinan; University of Toronto
摘要：We combine classic occupational choice (Roy model) and frictionless matching (following Sattinger) to explain earnings by occupation and firm in a way that is consistent with double assignment. In our model, within-firm inequality is globally nonzero whenever there is asymmetry in the revenue function or the occupational skill distribution across occupations. Occupational earnings overlap each other, and, unlike in the Roy model, the distributions of potential earnings are endogenous. In line ...
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作者：Ide, Enrique; Talamas, Eduard
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：Artificial intelligence (AI) can transform the knowledge economy by automating noncodifiable work. To analyze this transformation, we incorporate AI into an economy where humans form hierarchical organizations: less knowledgeable individuals become workers doing routine work, while others become solvers handling exceptions. We model AI as a technology that converts computational resources into AI agents that operate autonomously (as coworkers and solvers/copilots) or nonautonomously (solely as...
