-
作者：Oprea, Ryan; Friedman, Daniel; Anderson, Steven T.
作者单位：United States Department of the Interior; United States Geological Survey
摘要：Human subjects decide when to sink a fixed cost C to seize an irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by Brownian motion. The optimal policy is to invest when V first crosses a threshold V* = (1 + w*)C, where the wait option premium w* depends on drift, volatility, and expiration hazard parameters. Subjects in the Low w* treatment on average invest at values quite close to optimum. Subjects in the two Medium and the High w* treatments invested at values below optimum, but...
-
作者：Fujiwara-Greve, Takako; Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro
作者单位：Keio University; University of Tokyo
摘要：Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and escape from partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships that a player can unilaterally end and start with a randomly assigned new partner with no information flow. Focusing on two-person, two-action Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships generates a significantly different evolutionary stability structure from ordinary random matching games. Monomorphic equilibria req...
-
作者：Chang, Yoosoon; Song, Wonho
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Chung Ang University
摘要：An IV approach, using as instruments non-linear transformations of the lagged levels, is explored to test for unit roots in panels with general dependency and heterogeneity across cross-sectional units. We allow not only for the cross-sectional dependencies of innovations, but also for the presence of co-integration across cross-sectional levels. Unbalanced panels and panels with differing individual short-run dynamics and cross-sectionally related dynamics are also permitted. We also more car...
-
作者：Lee, David S.
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper empirically assesses the wage effects of the Job Corps program, one of the largest federally funded job training programs in the U.S. Even with the aid of a randomized experiment, the impact of a training program on wages is difficult to study because of sample selection, a pervasive problem in applied microeconometric research. Wage rates are only observed for those who are employed, and employment status itself may be affected by the training program. This paper develops an intuit...
-
作者：Potters, Jan; Suetens, Sigrid
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in finitely repeated two-player games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes. The difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach stable full...
-
作者：Gavazza, Alessandro; Lizzeri, Alessandro
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters. Imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary. Government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability. Transfers are partly financed through government debt, and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems. The mode...
-
作者：Bolton, Patrick; Jeanne, Olivier
作者单位：Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We show how the willingness-to-pay problem and lack of exclusivity in sovereign lending may result in an equilibrium sovereign debt structure that is excessively difficult to restructure. A bankruptcy regime for sovereigns can alleviate this inefficiency but only if it is endowed with far-reaching powers to enforce seniority and subordination clauses in debt contracts. A bankruptcy regime that makes sovereign debt easier to restructure without enforcing seniority may decrease welfare.
