Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fujiwara-Greve, Takako; Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro
• 署名单位: Keio University; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00539.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 993-1021
• 关键词: social norms; COOPERATION

摘要

Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and escape from partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships that a player can unilaterally end and start with a randomly assigned new partner with no information flow. Focusing on two-person, two-action Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships generates a significantly different evolutionary stability structure from ordinary random matching games. Monomorphic equilibria require initial trust building, while a polymorphic equilibrium includes earlier cooperators than any strategy in monomorphic equilibria and is thus more efficient. This is due to the non-linearity of average payoffs.