Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Potters, Jan; Suetens, Sigrid
• 署名单位: Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00548.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1125-1147
• 关键词: repeated prisoners-dilemma; Social dilemmas; rational cooperation; limited rationality; oligopoly; BEHAVIOR; Heterogeneity; CONVERGENCE; equilibrium; INFORMATION

摘要

We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in finitely repeated two-player games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes. The difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach stable full cooperation, but mainly by differences in choices of pairs that do not succeed in reaching full cooperation.