Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolton, Patrick; Jeanne, Olivier
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Johns Hopkins University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00541.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 879-902
• 关键词: bankruptcy; default

摘要

We show how the willingness-to-pay problem and lack of exclusivity in sovereign lending may result in an equilibrium sovereign debt structure that is excessively difficult to restructure. A bankruptcy regime for sovereigns can alleviate this inefficiency but only if it is endowed with far-reaching powers to enforce seniority and subordination clauses in debt contracts. A bankruptcy regime that makes sovereign debt easier to restructure without enforcing seniority may decrease welfare.