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作者:Noussair, Charles N.; Trautmann, Stefan T.; van de Kuilen, Gijs
作者单位:Tilburg University
摘要:We study the prevalence of the higher order risk attitudes of prudence and temperance in an experiment with a large demographically representative sample of participants. Under expected utility, prudence and temperance are defined by a convex first, and concave second, derivative of the utility function, and have direct implications for saving behaviour and portfolio choice. In the experiment, participants make pairwise choices that distinguish prudent from imprudent, and temperate from intemp...
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作者:Avvisati, Francesco; Gurgand, Marc; Guyon, Nina; Maurin, Eric
作者单位:Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD); Paris School of Economics; National University of Singapore
摘要:This article provides evidence that schools can influence parents' involvement in education, and this has causal effects on pupils' behaviour. Furthermore, it shows how the impact of more involved parents on their children is amplified at the class level by peer group interaction. We build on a large-scale controlled experiment run in a French deprived educational district, where parents of middle-school children were invited to participate in a simple program of parent-school meetings on how ...
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作者:Rubinstein, Yona; Brenner, Dror
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Brown University
摘要:Do labour markets discriminate against workers with particular ethnic-sounding names? We use non-random sorting into inter-ethnic marriage and salient differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazi surnames to evaluate the causal impact of Sephardic affiliation on wages. Using the 1995 Israeli Census, we estimate the effect of a Sephardic sounding surname on wages. We first compare the wages of Israeli Jewish males born to Sephardic fathers and Ashkenazi mothers (SA), who are more likely to carry...
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作者:Stinebrickner, Ralph; Stinebrickner, Todd R.
作者单位:Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要:Taking advantage of unique longitudinal data, we provide the first characterization of what college students believe at the time of entrance about their final major, relate these beliefs to actual major outcomes, and provide an understanding of why students hold the initial beliefs about majors that they do. The data collection and analysis are based directly on a conceptual model in which a student's final major is best viewed as the end result of a learning process. We find that students ent...
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作者:Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania
摘要:We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and/or the monitoring structure. Each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned. We show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain ...
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作者:Card, David; Devicienti, Francesco; Maida, Agata
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要:Rent-sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk capital are captured in higher wages. We propose a simple measure of this holdup effect based on the size of the wage offset for firm-specific capital accumulation. Using Social Security earnings records for workers in the Veneto region of Italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers, we find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents ...
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作者:Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位:University of Copenhagen; Brown University; University of Vienna
摘要:Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions (IS) or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, IS surprisingly oft...
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作者:Leslie, Phillip; Sorensen, Alan
作者单位:National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要:We estimate an equilibrium model of ticket resale in which consumers' and brokers' decisions in the primary market reflect rational expectations about the resale market. Estimation is based on a unique dataset that merges transaction details from both the primary and secondary markets for tickets to major rock concerts. In our model, the presence of a resale market permits tickets to be traded from low-value to high-value consumers, but it also stimulates costly efforts by consumers and broker...
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作者:Krishna, Pravin; Senses, Mine Zeynep
作者单位:Johns Hopkins University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:This article studies empirically the links between international trade and labour income risk faced by manufacturing sector workers in the U.S. We use longitudinal data on workers to estimate time-varying individual income risk at the industry level. We then combine our estimates of persistent labour income risk with measures of exposure to international trade to analyse the relationship between trade and labour income risk. We also study risk estimates from various subsamples of workers, such...
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作者:Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Grunewald, Andreas; Huffman, David
作者单位:IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Bonn; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Oxford
摘要:This article provides evidence that involuntary unemployment, and the segmentation of labour markets into firms offering good and bad jobs, may both arise as a consequence of contractual incompleteness. We provide a simple model that illustrates how unemployment and market segmentation may jointly emerge as part of a market equilibrium in environments where work effort is not third-party verifiable. Using experimental labour markets that differ only in the verifiability of effort, we demonstra...