Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yamamoto, Yuichi
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdt029
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 473-500
• 关键词: belief-free equilibria; repeated prisoners-dilemma; discounted repeated games; 2-person repeated games; partial folk theorem; incomplete information; EFFICIENCY; robust; payoffs

摘要

We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and/or the monitoring structure. Each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned. We show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a belief-free equilibrium. We also provide explicit equilibrium constructions in various economic examples.