Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; Brown University; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdt022
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 301-324
• 关键词: altruistic punishment; social preferences; COOPERATION; ENFORCEMENT; provision; fairness

摘要

Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions (IS) or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, IS surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both IS and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design.