Rent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel Data

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Card, David; Devicienti, Francesco; Maida, Agata
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdt030
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 84-111
• 关键词: investment; INNOVATION; unions; profits

摘要

Rent-sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk capital are captured in higher wages. We propose a simple measure of this holdup effect based on the size of the wage offset for firm-specific capital accumulation. Using Social Security earnings records for workers in the Veneto region of Italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers, we find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents per worker of around 4%, arising mainly at larger firms with higher price-cost margins. On the other hand, we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return on investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital.