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作者:Kolb, Aaron; Madsen, Erik
作者单位:Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; New York University
摘要:We study how an organization should dynamically screen an agent of uncertain loyalty whom it suspects of committing damaging acts of undermining. The organization controls the stakes of the relationship, while the agent strategically times undermining, which can occur repeatedly and is detected only stochastically. The optimal commitment stakes policy exhibits both discreteness and gradualism, with distinct untrusted and trusted phases featuring gradually rising stakes during the untrusted pha...
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作者:Ali, S. Nageeb; Lewis, Greg; Vasserman, Shoshana
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Microsoft; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:Firms have ever-increasing access to consumer data, which they use to personalize their advertising and to price discriminate. This raises privacy concerns. Policymakers have argued in response that consumers should be given control over their data, able to choose what to share and when. Since firms learn about a consumer's preferences both from what they do and do not disclose, the equilibrium implications of consumer control are unclear. We study whether such measures improve consumer welfar...
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作者:Gentry, Matthew; Komarova, Tatiana; Schiraldi, Pasquale
作者单位:State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要:Motivated by the prevalence of simultaneous bidding across a wide range of auction markets, we develop and estimate a model of strategic interaction in simultaneous first-price auctions when objects are heterogeneous and bidders have non-additive preferences over combinations. We establish non-parametric identification of primitives in this model under standard exclusion restrictions, providing a basis for both estimation and testing of preferences over combinations. We then apply our model to...
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作者:Dal Bo, Ernesto; Finan, Frederico; Folke, Olle; Persson, Torsten; Rickne, Johanna
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Uppsala University; Stockholm University; Stockholm University; University of Nottingham
摘要:We study the politicians and voters of the Sweden Democrats, a major populist radical-right party. Based on detailed administrative data, we present the first comprehensive account of which politicians are selected into such a party. Surveys show that politicians and voters of the Sweden Democrats share strong anti-establishment and anti-immigration attitudes that drastically set them apart from Sweden's other parties. Searching for individual traits that link naturally to these attitudes, we ...
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作者:Chen, Zhao; Jiang, Xian; Liu, Zhikuo; Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez; Xu, Daniel Yi
作者单位:Fudan University; University of California System; University of California Davis; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:We incorporate the lumpy nature of firm-level investment into the study of how tax policy affects investment behaviour. We show that tax policies can directly impact the lumpiness of investment. Extensive-margin responses to tax policy are key to understanding the effects of different tax reforms and to designing effective stimulus policies. We illustrate these results by studying China's 2009 VAT reform, which lowered the tax cost of investment and reduced partial irreversibility-the price ga...
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作者:Caoui, El Hadi
作者单位:University of Toronto; University of Toronto
摘要:This article studies the decentralized adoption of a technology standard when network effects are present. If the new standard is incompatible with the current installed base, adoption may be inefficiently delayed. I quantify the magnitude of excess inertia in the switch of the movie distribution and exhibition industries from 35 mm film to digital. I specify and estimate a dynamic game of digital hardware adoption by theatres and digital movies supply by distributors. Counterfactual simulatio...
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作者:Ball, Laurence; Mankiw, N. Gregory
作者单位:Johns Hopkins University; Harvard University
摘要:This article examines the optimal accumulation of capital and the effects of government debt in neoclassical growth models in which firms have market power and therefore charge prices above marginal cost. In this environment, the real interest rate earned by savers is less than the net marginal product of capital. We establish a new method for evaluating dynamic efficiency that can be applied in such economies. A plausible calibration suggests that the wedge between the real interest rate and ...
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作者:Deb, Rahul; Kitamura, Yuichi; Quah, John K. H.; Stoye, Jorg
作者单位:University of Toronto; Yale University; Johns Hopkins University; National University of Singapore; Cornell University
摘要:To determine the welfare implications of price changes in demand data, we introduce a revealed preference relation over prices. We show that the absence of cycles in this relation characterizes a consumer who trades off the utility of consumption against the disutility of expenditure. Our model can be applied whenever a consumer's demand over a strict subset of all available goods is being analysed; it can also be extended to settings with discrete goods and non-linear prices. To illustrate it...
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作者:Rogoff, Kenneth; You, Yang
作者单位:Harvard University; University of Hong Kong
摘要:Can massive online retailers such as Amazon and Alibaba issue digital tokens that potentially compete with bank debit accounts? There is a long history of trading stamps and loyalty points, but new technologies are poised to sharply raise the significance of redeemable assets as a store of value. Here, we develop a simple stylized model of redeemable tokens that can be used to study sales and pricing strategies for issuing tokens, including ICOs. Our central finding is that platforms can poten...
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作者:Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位:University of Zurich; Boston College
摘要:We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, l...