Preferences and Performance in Simultaneous First-Price Auctions: A Structural Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gentry, Matthew; Komarova, Tatiana; Schiraldi, Pasquale
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac030
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 852-878
• 关键词: sealed-bid auctions; procurement auctions; strategy equilibria; risk-aversion; synergies; entry; games; identification; PARTICIPATION; Combinatorial

摘要

Motivated by the prevalence of simultaneous bidding across a wide range of auction markets, we develop and estimate a model of strategic interaction in simultaneous first-price auctions when objects are heterogeneous and bidders have non-additive preferences over combinations. We establish non-parametric identification of primitives in this model under standard exclusion restrictions, providing a basis for both estimation and testing of preferences over combinations. We then apply our model to data on Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) highway procurement auctions, quantifying the magnitude of cost synergies and evaluating the performance of the simultaneous first-price mechanism in the MDOT marketplace.