Matching with Externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Boston College
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac032
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 948-974
• 关键词: Stable matchings; coalition-formation; school choice; power couples; STABILITY; MARKETS; assignment; preferences; substitutes; incentives

摘要

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.