Under Suspicion: Trust Dynamics with Secret Undermining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolb, Aaron; Madsen, Erik
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; New York University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac034
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 912-947
• 关键词: starting small

摘要

We study how an organization should dynamically screen an agent of uncertain loyalty whom it suspects of committing damaging acts of undermining. The organization controls the stakes of the relationship, while the agent strategically times undermining, which can occur repeatedly and is detected only stochastically. The optimal commitment stakes policy exhibits both discreteness and gradualism, with distinct untrusted and trusted phases featuring gradually rising stakes during the untrusted phase and a discrete gap in stakes between phases. This policy is also the equilibrium outcome when the organization cannot commit, and the agent's equilibrium undermining policy exhibits variable, non-monotonic intensity.