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作者：Miravete, Eugenio J.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Firms engage in foggy pricing when the menu of tariff options aims at profiting from consumer mistakes. The analysis of this paper concludes that the transition from monopoly to competition in the early US cellular telephone industry does not generally foster the use of such deceptive strategies. I offer three alternative measures to account for the fogginess of the menu of options offered by cellular carriers. All results are robust to the existence of uncertainty regarding future consumption...
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作者：Gale, Ian; O'Brien, Daniel P.
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：A use-or-lose provision requires that firms employ a certain minimum fraction of their productive capacity. Variants have been used by regulators in the airline and wireless communications industries, among others. A typical stated objective is to limit capacity hoarding, thereby increasing aggregate output and welfare. When the dominant firm is more efficient than fringe firms, we find that imposing a use-or-lose provision induces the dominant firm to acquire capacity from the fringe, which c...
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作者：Saggi, Kamal; Woodland, Alan; Yildiz, Halis Murat
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper compares equilibrium outcomes of two games of trade liberalization. In the Bilateralism game, countries choose whether to liberalize trade preferentially via a customs union (CU), multilaterally, or not at all. The Multilateralism game is a restricted version of the Bilateralism game in that countries cannot form CUs and can only undertake non-discriminatory trade liberalization. When countries have symmetric endowments, global free trade is the only stable equilibrium of both games...
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作者：Fox, Jeremy T.; Bajari, Patrick
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game...
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作者：Athey, Susan; Coey, Dominic; Levin, Jonathan
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict (out-of-sample) outcomes for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it increases small business participation. An alt...
