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作者：Cooper, David J.; Kuehn, Kai-Uwe
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of East Anglia; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space that permits threats of punishment...
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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Lee, Frances Zhiyun Xu
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We consider a war of attrition where the players can learn about a state that determines their payoffs at stochastic deadline. We study how the incentives to acquire information depend on the (un)verifiability of information and its implications for efficiency. Unverifiability creates distortions (strategic delay in concession or duplication in information acquisition), but encourages information acquisition. In our model, provided that the information acquisition cost is small, these two effe...
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作者：Kubler, Felix; Selden, Larry; Wei, Xiao
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Risk free asset demand in the classic portfolio problem is shown to decrease with income if and only if the consumer's uncertainty preferences over assets satisfy the preference condition that the risk free asset is more readily substituted for the risky asset as the quantity of the latter increases. In this case, the risky asset is said to be urgently needed following the terminology of the classic certainty analysis of Johnson (1913). The urgently needed property tends to be more readily sat...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Haifa; University of Haifa
摘要：We introduce an ordinal model of efficiency measurement. Our primitive is a notion of efficiency that is comparative, but not cardinal or absolute. In this framework, we postulate axioms that an ordinal efficiency measure should satisfy. Primary among these are choice consistency and planning consistency, which guide the measurement of efficiency in a firm with access to multiple technologies. Other axioms include scale invariance, strong monotonicity, and a continuity condition. These axioms ...
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作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas; Kartik, Navin
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：We study the characteristics of self-selected candidates in corrupt political systems. Individuals differ along two dimensions of unobservable character: public spirit (altruism) and honesty (disutility from selling out to special interests). Both aspects combine to determine an individual's quality as governor. We characterize properties of equilibrium candidate pools for arbitrary costs of running for office, including when costs become vanishingly small. We explore how policy instruments su...
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作者：Bolle, Friedel; Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Zizzo, Daniel John
作者单位：European University Viadrina Frankfurt Oder; University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：Vendettas occur in many real-world settings where rivals compete for a prize, e.g., winning a competitive promotion or retaining a job, by engaging in aggressive, retaliatory behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of winning a prize. Retaliatory vendettas occur and lead subjects to the worst possible outcomes in 2/3 of cases, counter to self-interest predictions, with large inefficiencies even in the absence of any immediate gain from aggressi...
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作者：Smith, Alec; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Camerer, Colin F.; Rangel, Antonio
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We investigate the feasibility of inferring the choices people would make (if given the opportunity) based on their neural responses to the pertinent prospects when they are not engaged in actual decision making. The ability to make such inferences is of potential value when choice data are unavailable, or limited in ways that render standard methods of estimating choice mappings problematic. We formulate prediction models relating choices to nonchoice neural responses, and use them to predict...
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作者：Campbell, Arthur; Ederer, Florian; Spinnewijn, Johannes
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study two sources of delay in teams: freeriding and lack of communication. Partners contribute to the value of a common project, but have private information about the success of their own efforts. When the deadline is far away, unsuccessful partners freeride on each others' efforts. When the deadline draws close, successful partners stop revealing their success to maintain their partners' motivation. We derive comparative statics results for common team performance measures and find that t...
