Collusion and the Organization of the Firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burlando, Alfredo; Motta, Alberto
• 署名单位: University of Oregon; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130067
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 54-84
• 关键词: supervision; INFORMATION; DELEGATION; CONTRACTS; DESIGN

摘要

This paper shows that the threat of collusion between a productive agent and the auditor in charge of monitoring production can influence a number of organizational dimensions of the firm, including outsourcing decisions and the allocation of production costs. We find that the optimal organizational response to internal collusion lets the agent choose between working outside the firm with no monitoring, or working within the firm with monitoring. In equilibrium, there are no rents due to collusion and the efficient worker works outside the firm. The results are robust to a number of extensions.