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作者：Bleichrodt, Han; Filko, Martin; Kothiyal, Amit; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Max Planck Society
摘要：Case-based decision theory (CBDT) provided a new way of revealing preferences, with decisions under uncertainty determined by similarities with cases in memory. This paper introduces a method to measure CBDT that requires no commitment to parametric families and that relates directly to decisions. Thus, CBDT becomes directly observable and can be used in prescriptive applications. Two experiments on real estate investments demonstrate the feasibility of our method. Our implementation of real i...
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作者：Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel
作者单位：European University Institute; University of Oslo
摘要：This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm-a mode of behavior followed by many-exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be m...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Cantala, David
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Colegio de Mexico
摘要：We analyze the dynamic assignment of objects to agents organized in a constant size waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, and information release. With private values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to the lottery, but waste is lower at the lottery. With common values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to any other mechanism, and w...
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作者：Ahlin, Christian
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：We study one-sided matching when groups with n > 2 members are being formed. Type-complementarity rules out all but the rank-ordered grouping. Type-substitutability (for example, matching to share risk) rules out much less. It requires that every two groups must be intertwined, in that each dominates the other at some rank. Intertwined matching is necessary and, in one context, sufficient for any grouping to be a potential equilibrium. But there are many intertwined matching patterns when n > ...
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作者：Li, Jin; Matouschek, Niko; Powell, Michael
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We examine an infinitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to...
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作者：Immorlica, Nicole; Kranton, Rachel; Manea, Mihai; Stoddard, Greg
作者单位：Microsoft; Duke University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University
摘要：We study social comparisons and status seeking in an interconnected society. Individuals take costly actions that have direct benefits and also confer social status. A new measure of interconnectedness-cohesion-captures the intensity of incentives for seeking status. Equilibria stratify players into social classes, with each class's action pinned down by cohesion. A network decomposition algorithm characterizes the highest (and most inefficient) equilibrium. Members of the largest maximally co...
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作者：Fleckinger, Pierre; Glachant, Matthieu; Moineville, Gabrielle
作者单位：Universite PSL; MINES ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Paris School of Economics
摘要：We develop a model of costly quality provision under biased disclosure. We define as friendly an environment in which the disclosure probability increases with quality, and as hostile an environment in which the opposite holds. Hostile environments produce a positive externality among sellers and potentially multiple equilibria. In contrast, friendly environments always yield a unique equilibrium. We establish that the environment that maximizes quality generates signals contradicting buyers' ...
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作者：Bond, Eric W.; Saggi, Kamal
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We analyze bargaining between a developing country (South) and a multinational firm over the local price of its patented product. We use an alternating offers bargaining game in which the South can resort to compulsory licensing (CL) if the two parties fail to reach agreement by a certain deadline. The presence of international price spillovers introduces two novel features into the standard bargaining problem: the surplus from entry prior to the CL deadline may be negative, and CL can yield h...
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作者：Deb, Rahul; Pai, Mallesh M.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Rice University
摘要：Discrimination (for instance, along the lines of race or gender) is often prohibited in auctions. This is legally enforced by preventing the seller from explicitly biasing the rules in favor of bidders from certain groups (for example, by subsidizing their bids). In this paper, we study the efficacy of this policy in the context of a single object: independent private value setting with heterogeneous bidders. We show that restricting the seller to using an anonymous, sealed bid auction format ...
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作者：Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Johansen, Bjorn Olav
作者单位：University of Bergen
摘要：We analyze a setting where a monopolist sells through retailers that set prices and provide valuable but non-contractible services to customers. We assume that contracts are private. We find that purely bilateral price restraints have no effect on the equilibrium outcome and that the standard Bertrand prices and service levels prevail. We also show that if manufacturers can commit to industry-wide resale prices, they can obtain higher prices and service levels but will generally not be able to...
