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作者：Silva, Francisco
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：The literature initiated by Green and Laffont (1986) studies principal-agent models with hard evidence. Evidence is modeled by assuming that the message set of the agent is type dependent. In this setup, Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) and Sher (2011) show that when the agent's utility function is type independent there is no advantage for the principal in having commitment power. This paper shows that this way of modeling evidence implicitly assumes it to be perfectly accurate and that the...
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作者：Wilson, Alistair J.; Vespa, Emanuel
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We experimentally examine how information transmission functions in an ongoing relationship. Where the one-shot-cheap-talk literature documents substantial overcommunication and preferences for honesty, the outcomes in our repeated setting are more consistent with uninformative babbling outcomes. This is particularly surprising, as honest revelation is supportable as an equilibrium outcome in our repeated setting. We show that inefficient outcomes are driven by a coordination failure on how to...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Cremer, Jacques
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study competition for the market in a dynamic model with network externalities, focusing on the efficiency of market outcomes. We propose a representation of the strategic advantages of incumbency and embed it in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. Then, we completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with several platforms emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the value of incumbency and analyze...
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作者：Butters, R. Andrew
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Measures of productivity reveal large differences across producers even within narrowly defined industries. Traditional measures of productivity, however, will associate differences in demand volatility to differences in productivity when adjusting factors of production is costly. I document this effect by comparing the influence of demand volatility on capacity utilization in a high (hotels) and low (airlines) adjustment cost industry. Differences in annual demand volatility explain a large s...
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作者：Mauring, Eeva
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：I show that market participants' equilibrium beliefs can create fluctuations in the volume of trading, even in a stationary environment. I study a sequential search model where buyers face an unknown distribution of offers. Each buyer learns about the distribution by observing whether a randomly chosen buyer traded yesterday. A cyclical equilibrium exists where the informational content of observing a trade fluctuates, which leads to fluctuations in the volume of trading. The cyclical equilibr...
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作者：Cao, Dan; Lagunoff, Roger
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：We examine the role of collateral in a dynamic model of optimal credit contracts in which a borrower values both housing and nonhousing consumption. The borrower's private information about his income is the only friction. An optimal contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion of the borrower's net worth is forfeited to the lender. We show that optimal contracts are always collateralized. The total value of forfeited assets is decreasing in income, highlighting the role of coll...
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作者：Lazzati, Natalia
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：This paper studies the diffusion process of two complementary technologies among people who are connected through a social network. It characterizes adoption rates over time for different initial allocations and network structures. In doing so, we provide some microfoundations for the stochastic formation of consideration sets. We are particularly interested in the following question: suppose we want to maximize technology diffusion and have a limited number of units of each of the two technol...
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作者：Lagerlof, Johan N. M.
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored co...
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作者：Benkert, Jean-Michel; Letina, Igor
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Bern; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Imai, Taisuke; Saito, Kota
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Munich
摘要：We present revealed-preference characterizations of the most common models of intertemporal choice: the model of exponentially discounted concave utility, and some of its generalizations. Our characterizations take consumption data as primitives, and provide nonparametric revealed-preference tests. We apply our tests to data from two recent experiments and find that our axiomatization delivers new insights and perspectives on datasets that had been analyzed by traditional parametric methods.
