The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Silva, Francisco
署名单位：
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20180038
发表日期：
2020
页码：
99-113
关键词：
摘要：
The literature initiated by Green and Laffont (1986) studies principal-agent models with hard evidence. Evidence is modeled by assuming that the message set of the agent is type dependent. In this setup, Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) and Sher (2011) show that when the agent's utility function is type independent there is no advantage for the principal in having commitment power. This paper shows that this way of modeling evidence implicitly assumes it to be perfectly accurate and that the result that commitment power has no value is not robust to making the evidence imperfect.
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